This paper considers the micro-econometric analysis of patients' hospital choice for elective medical procedures when their choice set is pre-selected by a general practitioner (GP). It proposes a two-stage choice model that encompasses both, patient and GP level optimization, and it discusses identification. The empirical analysis demonstrates biases and inconsistencies that arise when strategic pre-selection is not properly taken into account. We find that patients defer to GPs when assessing hospital quality and focus on tangible attributes, like hospital amenities; and that GPs, in turn, as patients' agents present choice options based on quality, but as agents of health authorities also consider their financial implications.
Introduction
In choice situations involving credence goods in which an "expert" agent with arguably superior information strategically presents a set of pre-selected choice alternatives to a principal decision maker, pre-selected choice sets are endogenous.
Choice of National Health Service (NHS) funded hospital services in England is an important case in point: Legislation in the mid 2000s gave patients free choice of hospital for elective medical procedures, but choice is implemented by a referral from the patient's general practitioner (GP) who is mandated to offer patients a set of choice alternatives.
1 This paper discusses the design and estimation of a choice model for the patient / GP decision process and identifies biases in estimation when the potential endogeneity of choice sets is ignored in the econometric model that forms the basis of analysis.
UK legislation (Department of Health (2004) GPs arguably possess superior information about salient attributes of the set of conceivable choice alternatives, notably with regard to the quality of medical treatment at a given hospital. In light of such information asymmetries, patients tend to defer to GPs' medical expertise, both when it comes to the need for treatment and the assessment of treatment quality at hospitals. 2 But GPs, to some extent, Monitor (2015) , the then sector regulator for health services in England, found that "many [patients] were also thought to be happy to be guided by their GP" as regards their are also agents for hospitals and health authorities more generally. In 2011/12, the period of our study, local healthcare budgets were controlled by Primary Care
Trusts (PCTs). 3 These budgets for the cost of care for the local population were fixed annually, and hospitals were paid a fixed price per referral. As a result, GPs had to take account of the financial implications of their referral decisions. 4 Consequently, when pre-selecting sets of choice alternatives for patients, GPs may face a conflict of interest which induces a misalignment of their incentives with patients' incentives. This wedge driven between the GP's and patients' incentives renders choice sets endogenous.
In conventional discrete choice analysis, e. proposes a model of consideration set formation that treats the inclusion decisions with respect to each choice alternative as independent and exogenously driven by product advertisement, absent a constraint on the choice set size. Gaynor, Propper and Seiler (2016) model the GP led consideration set formation subject to a constraint on the choice set size, by requiring that included choice alternatives be within a fixed distance of the alternative associated with maximal utility. Their model can be regarded as an alternative to the one proposed in this paper where distance is given an information theoretic interpretation and where heterogeneity in cost associated with utilitarian distance across experts (GPs) is modelled and quantified explicitly. This approach has a particularly intuitive appeal in light of information asymmetries.
From an econometric perspective, the endogeneity of the set of choice alternatives constitutes a potential sample selection problem. It essentially arises from correlation between unobservables in the agent-level selection model and those in principal-level final outcomes (choice) model. Such correlation may bias estimation results. This is similar to the well-known issue of incidental truncation (Heckman (1976) ) whereby decision outcomes of interest are only observed for a selected subsample and where failure to properly model the sample selection mechanism induces the estimates of the outcome relationship to be biased and inconsistent. This has also been noted by Eizenberg (2014) and Jacobi and Sovinsky (2016) . Similar issues also arise in the analysis of endogenous sample attrition (Hausman and Wise (1979) ).
Methodological econometric issues aside, why is the distinction between principal and agent when agents are imperfect relevant for applied work? It is well established that misalignment of incentives between a principal and an agent can give rise to market failures, resulting in suboptimal outcomes. In the present context, patients may be nudged into choosing a hospital that they would not have chosen had they been given different options. The distinction also matters for competition analysis.
Demand estimation and merger simulation often feature in antitrust authorities' investigations of mergers. Beckert et al. (2012) The empirical analysis in this paper presents results that demonstrate the potential inconsistency of estimators when the endogeneity of choice sets is ignored.
Estimates for the GP-level model proposed in this paper reveal that pre-selection by the GP is primarily driven by distance to the hospital, hospital quality and cost of treatment to the Clinical Commissioning Group that the GP is accountable to. The latter finding is consistent with GPs' conflict of interest at the intersection of their roles of agents of both, patients and health authorities. Once these drivers of GPlevel pre-selection are accounted for by the pre-selected choice set, the results show that patients consider the hospital alternatives in this set as being of comparable quality and that they focus on other tangible hospital attributes. In particular, it
shows that waiting times, once their endogeneity is taken account of, and hospital amenities are critical attributes to patients. In competing choice models, the effects of these attributes either appear implausible (e.g. Gaynor et al. (2016) who report positive waiting time effects for coronary artery bypass grafts 5 ) or statistically in- 5 They do point out that this finding can be rationalized in light of the severity of the underlying medical condition and the risk of the procedure; additional waiting time may leave the patient time to arrange necessary personal affairs.
significant. At the same time, the residual distance effect that emerges is much more muted from the patient's perspective than has been found in other models, where it has conventionally been found to be the dominant driver of choice (e.g. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the institutional background with regard to patient choice in the English NHS. Section 3 describes the data that forms the empirical basis of the study. Section 4 lays out econometric models for the patient / GP decision process and discusses pertinent identification and estimation issues. Section 4 presents results from the estimation of these models.
And Section 5 concludes, with a view to adaptations of the empirical strategy of this paper to similar principal-agent choice settings.
Institutional Background
The majority of primary and secondary health care in England is provided through the taxpayer funded National Health Service (NHS). 6 For patients, it is free at the point of use. Primary care is provided by General Practitioners (GPs). In the period studied in this paper, 2011/12, publicly funded local bodies, Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), make up the NHS commissioning system, i.e. they manage health care budgets and purchase secondary care, e.g. for elective medical procedures and other hospital services, for the local population. GPs thereby make referral decisions and so get to decide how some of the health care budgets is spent. 7 Patients obtain access to secondary care through a referral from their GP. GPs therefore act ask gatekeepers to secondary care, both with regard to in-patient and out-patient appointments.
Several waves of legislative reforms of the NHS over the past decade have increased the choice patients have over where they receive elective care. The first set of reforms gave patients a formal choice over where to attend a first outpatient 6 A private health care market exists in the UK, but it is excluded from the analysis of this paper. 7 Patient choice of GP is relatively limited and typically restricted to GPs whose practices are local to the patient's area of residence; i.e. patients living in a given PCT are registered with a GP in the same PCT.
appointment when referred by their GP (or consultant). From January 2006, GPs were required to offer patients a choice of (four to) five hospitals. They were also required to raise awareness of patients' right to choose. This replaced a system where patients could state preferences but GPs were under no obligation to offer patients a choice. In 2008, essentially all restrictions on the number of providers patients were able to choose from were removed. This established "free choice" of provider.
These reforms were motivated by both, the belief that patients valued the choice over their care, and evidence that health care competition when prices were fixed could improve quality (Gaynor (2006) ). A series of work has estimated the impact of patient choice on hospital quality by comparing areas with different degrees of potential competition, and finds that higher degrees of competition are associated with greater improvements in quality (Cooper et al. (2011) , Gaynor et al. (2013) ).
From a practical point of view, the choice architecture was implemented through an electronic booking system, under the moniker "Choose and Book", which allows
GPs to shortlist appropriate hospital services for their patients and, subsequently, enables patients to book their appointment, either at the GP practice, by phone or online. In this institutional setting, the GP is a pivot critical to the patient's exercise of choice. implications. Therefore, when making referrals, an important part of the GP's role is to act as a rationing agent on behalf of the PCT which pays for care (Blundell et al. (2010) which put the actual number of deaths at the hospital in relation to the expected number of deaths, given the characteristics of the patients treated at the hospital (case mix). They also include the aforementioned Market Forces Factor (MFF) and hospital amenities, such as parking spaces at the hospital.
HES records also record the GP practice that made the referral for treatment at a hospital site. Using the GP practice identifier, practice attributes can be included, some of them also from HSCIC sources. Practice attributes will be relevant to the extent that they act as drivers of practice level costs of pre-selecting choice alternatives. 13 They include the number of GPs at the practice: Larger practices enjoy a richer pool of experience and information and hence are likely to more easily facilitate choice. The analysis also considers measures of the homogeneity of the practice's patient pool. From HES records, we construct the coefficient of variation with respect to age at the practice level as a measure of dispersion. This is motivated by evidence (Harding et al. (2014) ) that older patients, while valuing the freedom to choose, tend to shun exercising choice and to revert to their local hospital. This would suggest that the cost of promoting choice is higher at practices with patients of older ages.
The locational information regarding patients, GPs and hospitals sites permits calculating distances between hospitals and patients, and GPs respectively.
These GP-level referral data allow to construct hospitals' catchment areas with respect to hip replacements, i.e. the set of GP practices that refer hip replacement practices and their patients are excluded. 13 The following section provides a detailed exposition of the two-stage choice model that discusses the role of costs at the first stage of GP-level pre-selection.
patients to them. The panel structure of the data, which associates multiple patients at the practice with potentially different treatment destinations, allows us to infer, or at least approximate, the set of hospital alternatives pre-selected by the GP as the set of hospitals that patients at a given practice were referred to and treated at. This is the same evidence base as in Gaynor et al. (2016) . The approach taken in this paper implicitly assumes that hospitals that were never chosen are not part of the choice set and discussion between GP and patient; and that even if they had featured in discussions, yet were never chosen, they would be eventually dropped, being irrelevant alternatives. It also assumes that the sample is informative enough to separate with reasonable reliability hospitals that were never chosen from those that were chosen by some patients. This leaves a risk of potential measurement error in the construction of the pre-selected choice sets at the GP practice level, which will be considered when assessing potential resulting biases in estimation.
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The approximation adopted in this paper, in our view, is the best possible approach given the available empirical basis for health care demand analysis. HES data are currently the most comprehensive data records for this kind of undertak- provided complete survey responses (GfK presentation to CC, 2013). Furthermore, stated preference surveys risk to yield biased responses in this context. The use of revealed preference data allows the analyst to overcome these challenges. Table 3 shows the distribution of the number of hospitals referred to, at the GP practice level. Even though giving patients choice was mandated already for several years by 2011/12, a large fraction of GP practices (43.15 per cent in the sample used in the analysis) only referred to a single hospital (that meets the attribute data requirements); this is consistent with GP survey evidence (e.g. Monitor (2015)) that many GPs identify a "default provider". And over ninety percent refer to no more than three; also this is consistent with GP survey evidence (Monitor (2015), Dixon et al. (2010)) that most GPs discuss two or three, and at most five, hospital alternatives with their patients.
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The average age of hip replacement patients is 68.6, but the variation at the practice level is skewed to the left, i.e. towards practices with more homogeneous patient pools with respect to age. The mean number of GPs at the practice level is just below 4, equally skewed to the left, i.e. to practices with a small number of GPs. Table 4 summarizes these practice characteristics.
Econometric Model
This section describes a two-stage model for the GP and patient level choice process.
It captures the GP's pre-selection of a choice set of hospital alternatives at the first stage, from which the patient makes a final choice at the second stage. In order to bring out the sample-selection issues arising in this context, a simple GP-level model is sketched first, absent any constraints on the size of the pre-selected set. This serves as a backdrop to the main model of GP-level cost-constrained pre-selection. The section also offers a discussion of salient identification issues.
Unconstrained Pre-Selection
This section presents a simple econometric two-stage decision model in which the first-stage pre-selection mechanism is unconstrained. It shows how choice set pre- 
where α j denotes the measurable component of v ⋆ j , ξ j is unobserved by the econometrician, and v j is a binary inclusion indicator, taking value one when the agent's net benefit assessment is positive so that j is included in J a , and zero otherwise. Here, ξ j might capture, in particular, the unquantifiable quality assessment of alternative j by the agent, e.g. to the extent that it affects the agent's prospective reputation or other subjective or "soft" attributes of alternative j. In this preliminary and simple framework, the GP has all the information relevant to him, each choice alter-native is assessed by the GP individually and independently on its own merits, and
. An alternative and more realistic pre-selection mechanism is outlined below.
Now consider patient i, the ultimate beneficiary of the choice outcome. Suppose with any conceivable choice alternative i associates an indirect conditional utility
that comprises a measurable component δ ij , next to unobserved components ζ ij and ϵ ij . Here, δ ij might capture observable attributes of j that relate directly to i, e.g.
geographic distance, coverage of specific idiosyncratic risks, etc. The (to the econometrician) unobservable ζ ij might reflect quality aspects of alternative j that are unobserved by the econometrician, and it may or may not vary with i; a precise structure for ζ ij is given in the following subsection. Patient i's idiosyncratic taste or preference for j, modelled by ϵ ij , is also unobserved by the econometrician. The indirect utility that patient i associates with alternative j is latent, but inference about δ ij is possible to the extent that j is included in J a , in that it can be observed whether or not j is chosen by i. Consider the case when ξ j and ζ ij are allowed to be correlated. This may arise when unobserved quality aspects of alternative j are at least partly relevant to both, the patient and the GP. This is plausibly so when the GP's reputation hinges on matching up decision makers, like patient i, with beneficial choice outcomes, like j. It can also arise from subjective assessments of "soft" (i.e. not easily quantifiable or measurable) attributes of the choice alternative.
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Then, given j ∈ J a ,ũ 
where
is the inclusive value of the set comprising the pre-selected hospitals. The expression for Pr(Y ij = 1|J a ) demonstrates that the selection terms ϕ(α j ), j ∈ J a , constitute regressors that are omitted in analyses that ignore strategic choice set pre-selection by the GP, provided correlation between ξ j and ζ ij cannot be ruled out and the selection terms vary across j ∈ J a . Such omission will yield inconsistent maximum likelihood estimates, as a consequence of model mis-specification.
Sovinsky Goeree (2008) presents a related model of random choice or consideration sets at the level of the decision maker in which the probability of the decision maker being informed about a choice alternative j takes the place of the inclusion probability Pr(v j = 1 
Constrained Pre-Selection

Modelling Approach
The model proposed in this section encompasses costs of information acquisition and dissemination. Such costs are low for "experts" such as GPs, but high for "laymen" such as patients. They thereby create a role for the former to pre-select choice sets out of the universe of choice alternatives for the benefit of the latter. The model shows how merely partial alignment of relevant evaluation criteria between GPs and patients (experts and laymen, or the agent and the principal) introduces an inefficiency into the choice process, in that it induces a divergence between the distribution of choice outcomes under pre-selection and the distribution of choice outcomes in the absence of information costs. It also shows that, to the extent that the GP does not possess complete information about the patients' evaluation criteria and does not tailor the pre-selected choice sets to the idiosyncratic evaluation outcomes of the patient, but instead offers a uniform choice sets to all patients, a further divergence is introduced, enhancing the level of inefficiency of the choice process.
As a reference for this subsection, the columns labelled "GP" and "patient" of Table 1 summarize the (mis-)alignment structure of the GP and patient models and the GP's incomplete information. Details on the econometric specification and the econometrician's information will be provided in Sections 4.2.2-4.2.4.
The model distinguishes attributes of hospital j that matter to patient i, summarized in indirect utility u ij , that are not perfectly aligned with those that the 
where . The efficiency loss due to pre-selection by the GP can then be cast as
The first term captures the efficiency loss due to the reduction in complexity of the choice problem, while the second term captures the additional efficiency loss arising from a misalignment of assessment criteria between patient and GP which results in a choice set J a i which may be suboptimal when evaluated on the basis of the attributes x c and x p relevant to the patient.
The pre-selected choice sets J a i vary across patients i, to the extent that the attributes considered by both, GP and patient, x c ij , vary with i; e.g. distance between i and hospital j. In practice, the GP may pre-select a uniform choice set J a at the outset on the basis of x a and x c as they relate to the "average patient"
and then offer this set to all patients at the practice. This wedge between the pre-selected choice set based on average attributes, rather than those specific to i, introduces yet another layer of potential inefficiency into the choice mechanism, so that the total inefficiency measured by the KL divergence is
Uniformity of the pre-selected choice set across i adds, for each patient i, an additional potential efficiency loss.
Econometric Specification: The Patient's Choice Problem
As above and in Table 1 , let x c ij denote hospital j's attributes that are taken into account by both, GP and patient; x p ij those that only matter to the patient; and x a j those that only matter to the GP, in the role of the patient's agent. For simplicity, suppose that patient and GP attach the same weights (coefficients) θ c to x c ij , and specify
where θ a and θ p are parameter vectors and α ij , taking the role of α j above, reflects the possible variation of x across i, in addition to j. The indirect utility of alternative j to patient i, latent to the econometrician, is then
where, as above, ζ ij and ϵ ij are unobserved by the econometrician.
Condition on the set of hospital alternatives J a i pre-selected by the GP. 20 Under the assumption that the errors ϵ p ij are i.i.d. type 1 extreme value and assuming that patient i takes the pre-selected choice set J a i as given 21 , conditional on ζ
while, absent the pre-selection, 20 In the setting of this subsection, J a i may depend on i, to the extent that the agent wholly espouses the attributes that principal i values and that these vary with i, e.g. distance.
21 This amounts to assuming that the patient behaves non-strategically and does not question how the GP arrived at the pre-selection outcome J a i .
This implies that the divergence of the distribution of patient level choice outcomes under pre-selection relative to their distribution absent pre-selection, in terms of the Kullback-Leibler measure, is
Econometric Specification: The GP's Selection Problem
Let the GP's assessment of i's valuation of alternative j, latent to the econometrician, Denote the econometrician's incomplete information about the GP (agent) specific 
is to order the alternatives in J according to their indirect utilities,
and to include the ones up to the point that
This also implies that
Since C = c(z) is unknown to the econometrician, this identifies an upper bound on C. Similarly, Ishii (2005) in that in her work only the cardinality of the optimal set is chosen, while here in addition the specific elements of the optimal set are determined.
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Notice also that this model of GP pre-selection is reminiscent of the one proposed 
To the extent that µ ij = µ the model of unconstrained pre-selection, the selection term here does not permit a closed-form solution and needs to be simulated.
The contribution of patient i to the likelihood function is then given by
where C) ) .
Identification
The patient's choice model, i.e. δ ij conditional on the pre-selected J a i , is identified through patients' choices from this set and variation in attributes across choice alternatives. Regarding the GP's pre-selection model, α ij is identified through variation in attributes across alternatives and their inclusion in, respectively exclusion from, Trust that the GP belongs to. Figure 1 shows that the MFF within and across GP practices exhibits considerable variation and hence is not merely a measure of the GP practice's geographic location. Hospitals attributes x c that are assumed to be considered by both, patient and GP, include the respective distance to a hospital and the (median) waiting time until treatment at the hospital.
As alluded to earlier, the cost function c(z) needs to be convex in order to guarantee an interior solution, i.e. a pre-selected set J a that is a (strict) subset of J . Costs in this model are in the same units as is indirect utility. Hence, the average level of costs, which is not attributed to cost drivers, and the average level of indirect utility, which is not due to alternative specific attributes, cannot be identified separately.
Metha et al. (2003) encounter an analogous lack of identification. Furthermore, this cost function must be specified at the GP (practice) level, i.e. it cannot vary with hospital alternative j; if it did, then for an included hospital alternative it would be indistinguishable from the utility contribution of that hospital to the inclusive value associated with J a . For GPs at the practice, including a hospital in the choice set J a may be costly because its salient characteristics need to be researched and because its suitability for a patient with given characteristics needs to be assessed. To control for this, the analysis considers as a second cost driver the coefficient of variation with respect to age of patients at the practice level.
Finally, the GP's consideration set needs to be defined in a practical manner. then selects those NHS providers that are closest and discusses which the patient would prefer"; hospitals local to the patient are also local to the GP practice as patient overwhelmingly choose nearby GP practices; and GP survey respondents say they typically discuss no more than two or three, and at most five, hospitals options. Also, to place this approach into the context of research practice, defining the consideration set via a limit on joint market share to manage the computational burden is not uncommon. For example, Eizenberg (2012) in his study of the home PC market restricts the number of product lines to those whose joint market share is 70 percent. A notable difference between the constrained pre-selection and the unconstrained linear probability model is that the effect of waiting time dominates the quality effect in the latter, while the reverse is the case in the former.
Results
Estimation of Pre-Selection Model
The linear probability model does not constrain the cardinality of the pre-selected choice set. In contrast to that, the constrained pre-selection model does. Its estimates show that the cost of including choice alternatives in J a is driven predominantly by the GP practice size in terms of number of GPS at the practice. The larger the practice, the lower the cost of including hospitals into the pre-selected choice sets. As discussed earlier, one may not be able to entirely rule out the presence of measurement error in the construction of consideration sets. If this measurement error were correlated with practice size, then the coefficient on the number of GPs at the practice level would be biased upward in absolute value. The homogeneity of the patient pool at the GP practice level in terms of age plays a role as well, albeit a more muted one. The estimates show that practices with a more homogeneous patient pool in terms of age, i.e. with a lower coefficient of variation for patient age, face higher costs of, or lower net benefits from, including hospitals into J a .
Patient Level Choice
The patient level hospital choice model is specified as a multinomial logit model.
Next to x c -distance and waiting time -, the model includes, as x p , the number of parking spaces at the hospital as an amenity that is considered by the patient, but not the GP. At the level of actual patient choice, waiting time is treated as potentially endogenous. Indeed, patients may face longer waiting times at higher quality hospitals that are popular with, and chosen by, many patients; a regression of waiting times on mortality rates (HSMR) yields a statistically significant negative coefficient. The analysis therefore employs the control function approach (Blundell and Powell (2003) ), including the residuals from the regression of waiting times on HSMR (wait res) among the hospital attributes. To control for the effect of preselection, the residuals backed out from the pre-selection model estimations are also included. To the extent that GPs convey to patients any quality information about the pre-selected hospitals that does not only factor into the GPs' pre-selection, but also into patients' choice decisions, e.g. through patients' own quality assessments, these residuals would be expected to show up statistically significant in the patient level choice model. Table 6 The residuals from the linear probability model do enter the model as statistically significant, with a positive coefficient. But the reason for this finding is that these residuals can be thought of as embedding a hospital fixed effect which is proportional to the fraction of GP practices that include a given hospital in the set J a of preselected hospitals. Hence, the residuals from the linear probability model merely capture the frequency with which hospitals are offered, and more frequently offered hospitals are more likely to be chosen. 23 Beckert et al. (2012) report a similar result. 24 This also explains the slightly higher value of the log likelihood function in the model using this set of residuals.
Finally, Table 7 presents the same two multinomial logit specifications without conditioning on J a and, instead, simply considering the set of the fifteen nearest hospitals as the patient's choice set. Comparing these with the results from the models that condition on J a , as in Table 6 , it is seen that the distance effect is overestimated in absolute value. The reason is that distance was seen to be the dominant pre-selection criterion on the part of the GP. Therefore, non-selected hospitals, among the 15 nearest in J \ J a , tend to be more distant on average, and in estimation the low choice incidence of distant hospitals among patients induces a large (in absolute value) estimate of the distance coefficient. At the same time, the waiting time effect is slightly underestimated compared to the model that conditions on J a . This may be explained by the fact that patients, when facing a set J a of nearby, roughly equidistant hospitals of similar quality pre-selected by the GP, prefer hospitals with shorter waiting times. Finally, the effect of amenities, like parking, is not identified. While they matter to patients, their effect risks being diluted when patient and GP are collapsed into a seemingly sole decision making entity. 23 For example, consider hospitals A,B, and C in GP1's consideration set, and hospitals C,D and E in GP2's consideration set; suppose, GP1 selects B and C, and GP2 selects C and D. Then the FE for C is higher than for B and D, simply because it is in both GPs' consideration set, even if GP1 ranks B higher than C and GP2 ranks D higher than C. Everything else equal, the FE for C is twice the FE for B and D, respectively. 24 See their Table 1 , which reports a positive coefficient on GP referral frequency.
Taken together, these comparisons may caution against ignoring, and simplistic modelling, of strategic pre-selection of choice sets, especially in the class of logit models popular with applied researchers.
Conclusions
This paper considers the microeconometric analysis of GP / patient choice processes in which the ultimate beneficiary of the choice outcome, the patient in the role of the principal, is advised by a GP, the principal's agent, through the GP's strategic pre-selection of a choice set for the patient. The paper presents a specific application to hospital choice for an elective procedure, hip replacements, in the setting of the The results could be of interest to policy makers because they show that GPs make some fairly complex trade-offs, which would suggest they shape competition in publicly funded health care services, equilibrating between excessive quality competition in a fixed-price system and excessive price competition at the expense of quality. In fact, this is in line with how hospitals appear to interact with GPs, as conduits to patients. Merger investigations by the UK competition authority, for example, have found evidence of hospitals focusing their marketing efforts on GPs. 
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Expert agents may be more broadly understood. They may be social media plat- instances where such demands are not fully aligned with the interest of shareholders and investors as those with a direct interest in the outputs of the audit. 30 Similarly, in merger analysis in consumer retail markets, improper modelling of the critical role that retailers play in the pre-selection of consumer choice sets is an acknowledged limitation of currently prevailing approaches and is an as of yet empirically largely unresolved consideration. All regressors are standardized. mff: market forces factor; hsmr: hospital standardised mortality rate. 
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